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Abstract 
  The federal government’s Race to the Top competition has promoted the 
adoption of test-based value-added measures (VAM) of performance as a 
component of teacher evaluations throughout many states, but the validity of 
these measures has been controversial among researchers and widely 
contested by teachers’ unions. A key concern is the extent to which 
nonrandom sorting of students to teachers may bias the results and lead to a 
misclassification of teachers as high or low performing. In light of potential 
for bias, it is important to assess the extent to which evidence of sorting can 
be found in the large administrative data sets used for VAM estimation. 
Using a large longitudinal data set from an anonymous state, we find 
evidence that a nontrivial amount of sorting exists—particularly sorting 
based on prior test scores—and that the extent of sorting varies 
considerably across schools, a fact obscured by the types of aggregate 
sorting indices developed in prior research. We also find that VAM 
estimation is sensitive to the presence of nonrandom sorting. There is less 
agreement across estimation approaches regarding a particular teacher’s 
rank in the distribution of estimated effectiveness when schools engage in 
sorting. 
 
 
The work here was supported by IES Statistical Research and Methodology grant 
#R305D10028 and in part by a Pre-Doctoral Training Grant from the IES, U.S. Department 
of Education (Award # R305B090011) to Michigan State University. The opinions 
expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Institute or the 
U.S. Department of Education. The authors would like to thank Doug Harris and session 
participants at the Association for Education Finance and Policy annual meeting for helpful 
comments. 
 
This is a preprint of an article published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21781/abstract  
 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government’s Race to the Top competition has promoted the adoption of test-based 
performance measures as a component of teacher evaluations throughout many states. The 
validity of test-based measures of teacher performance has been the subject of ongoing debate 
among researchers (see, for example, Harris, 2009, and Hill, 2009) and has been widely 
contested by teachers’ unions, however. A key concern is the extent to which nonrandom 
assignment of students to teachers may bias the results and lead to a misclassification of teachers 
as high or low performing (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007; Kane & Staiger, 2008; 
Rothstein, 2010; Koedel & Betts, 2011; Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, in press). While the 
potential for nonrandom assignment to bias teacher value-added measures (VAMs) has been well 
recognized, little research has investigated how principals assign students to teachers in practice 
and the direct consequences of their assignment behaviors for ongoing teacher evaluations.  
It is important to assess the extent to which evidence of nonrandom assignment can be 
found in the large administrative data sets used for VAM estimation. A few studies have 
approached this issue by considering broad statistical measures of sorting behavior (Clotfelter, 
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007). Our study makes several key 
contributions to the literature. First, we develop tests of sorting that are more useful and precise 
than those previously used in the literature. Our tests lead us to revise prior conclusions as to the 
prevalence of sorting. Using a large longitudinal data set from an anonymous state,
1
 we find 
clear evidence that student grouping exists in a nontrivial number of schools—particularly 
grouping based on prior test scores—and that the extent of grouping varies considerably both 
within and across schools, a fact obscured by the approaches developed in prior research.  
                                               
1 As a condition of data use, it has been requested that we do not refer to the state explicitly. 
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Second, we investigate teacher-student matching, extending the research beyond the 
simple investigation of tracking patterns. We distinguish between two components of nonrandom 
assignment and examine evidence of both: the grouping of students together on the basis of some 
characteristic and the systematic assignment of these groups to teachers. We find evidence to 
suggest that in many cases teachers are nonrandomly assigned to classes. In particular, teachers 
with higher measured prior effectiveness tend to be assigned to classrooms with higher average 
prior achievement.  
Third, we show the implications of sorting for value-added using our statewide 
administrative data. We demonstrate that statistical methods matter and that they react very 
differently to different sorting scenarios. To do so, we define subsamples of school-grade-years 
that exhibit different grouping and assignment behaviors and then examine correlations within 
subsamples among VAMs estimated in different ways. We find the sensitivity of value-added to 
particular estimators differs in potentially important ways by subsample and that these 
differences align with predictions based on the standard value-added framework (Guarino, 
Reckase, & Wooldridge, in press). These findings have important consequences for the 
proliferation of teacher evaluations systems—and particularly for sanction-based policies such as 
the deselection or involuntary transfer of low performers (Winters & Cowen, 2013; Grissom, 
Loeb, & Nakashima, 2014)—that are currently the subject of intense scrutiny and controversy. 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a framework for 
thinking about the process by which principals assign students to teachers and discusses the 
implications for VAMs. The next section discusses the data used, which is followed by a section 
on previous approaches to identifying nonrandom assignment in administrative data. This 
discussion leads to a section that outlines our approach to detecting nonrandom grouping and 
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assignment and presents the findings. The penultimate section shows how our results on the 
grouping and assignment decisions of schools can be used to inform value-added estimation, and 
the final section concludes.  
FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND 
The theoretical motivation for value-added models of teacher performance typically rests on the 
specification of an education production function, in which achievement is modeled as a function 
of all relevant past and present child, family, and schooling inputs. Here, we focus on two 
estimating equations derived from this model that serve as the basis for most value-added 
estimation (for a detailed discussion of the derivation of these equations from the general model 
and the underlying assumptions see Hanushek, 1979, 1986; Todd & Wolpin, 2003; Harris, Sass, 
& Semykina, 2010; Guarino, Reckase & Wooldridge, in press). We start with a lag score 
specification controlling for prior achievement on the right-hand side:  
                                                                                     
       
                
                        
                           
                                      
                                           
                                               
                                                                                                          
 
Occasionally, researchers use the gain in test scores as the dependent variable, effectively 
assuming that λ is equal to 1. We will refer to this as the gain score specification: 
 
                                                                    
              
Note that we include the additional term, i,t-1, on the right-hand side of equation (2) in 
order to emphasize the fact that if 
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to an omitted variables bias. This potential omitted variables problem will be the key focus of the 
analysis to follow. 
Generally speaking, our ability to consistently estimate the teacher value-added 
coefficients ( ) hinges on what our estimation method requires about the correlation between 
teacher assignments (captured by Tit) and the unobserved factors affecting achievement,    ,   , 
and, in the case of the gain-score specification, i,t-1. Here, our concern lies with 
understanding how different student sorting and teacher assignment mechanisms employed by 
schools may affect these correlations and, in turn, value-added estimates based on equations (1) 
and (2). 
Throughout the paper, we distinguish how students are grouped together into classrooms 
from how teachers are assigned to those classrooms. This leads to three distinct types of 
assignment mechanisms that each has different value-added implications: random grouping of 
students into classes and random assignment of teachers to those classes, nonrandom grouping of 
students but with random assignment of teachers to the classes, and finally nonrandom grouping 
with nonrandom assignment. 
 In the simplest case, students may be randomly grouped into classrooms with no 
consideration given to the within-class composition of student ability or to the quality of the 
teacher assigned to the groups. In this case, given a sufficient number of observations per 
teacher, estimates of teacher value-added based on either equation (1) or (2) will tend to perform 
well since any omitted factors that contribute to achievement will be uncorrelated with teacher 
assignment. 
Now consider the case in which schools actively group students of similar ability together 
based on, say, prior achievement, demographic characteristics related to ability, or markers of 
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ability unobserved by those outside the school. Further assume that teachers are assigned to these 
classrooms in a systematic way according to each teacher’s ability to raise achievement. 
Grouping based on observable student demographic characteristics (captured in Xit) is of less 
concern for estimators that partial out this correlation as both equation (1) and (2) control for 
those factors. Note, however, that grouping based on prior test scores coupled with nonrandom 
assignment of teachers based on ability to those groups is problematic for estimates based on 
equation (2). Specifically, i,t-1 is non-zero, correlated with teacher assignment, and 
omitted from the model in this case. In contrast, by not restricting λ=1, estimates based on 
equation (1) are not subject to the same omitted variables bias. Effectively the cost of assuming 
λ=1 is higher in these cases.2  
To help illustrate the implications of the bias, we appeal to a simple stylized example of 
estimating value-added with a model of only two teachers. While this certainly abstracts from the 
general problem of estimating equations (1) and (2), the simplified model will provide clear 
insights into the nature of the biases and inconsistencies that apply to the final estimation 
problem. Consider the case with two teachers (denoted Teacher 0 and Teacher 1) where the true 
education production function is given by: 
 
       
                                                                                                                       
       
                          
  
                      
                                            
                          
       
                                               
2 Cases of explicit test score grouping and assignment will also be more sensitive to possible misspecification of the 
current-score-lag-score relationship, including possible nonlinearities. In the analyses presented in this paper, we 
focus on specifications that assume a linear relationship between current and prior test scores. However, we ran 
sensitivity analyses that used specifications that included various polynomials in prior achievement and found 
virtually identical results.  
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It will be helpful to subtract    
  from both sides of the equation: 
      
          
This framework can be used to illustrate the direction of the bias associated with using the gain 
score equation when    . In this simple setup, the OLS estimate of   using the lag score 
specification is simply the Wald Estimator comparing the mean outcomes, expressed net of the 
prior score (      
 ), for students with Teacher 1 to those for Teacher 0: 
  ̂   [      
 |    ]   [      
 |    ]                   
  [     |    ]   [     |    ]    
 
Many of the potential issues we encounter will stem from using the “wrong”  . In the case of the 
gain score specification, we have assumed    , implying the following estimating equation: 
     
         
         
Now the Wald Estimate of   can be expressed as: 
  ̂   [     
 |    ]   [     
 |    ]                                    
  [       
        |    ]   [       
        |    ] 
  [       
 |    ]     [       
 |    ] 
        [ [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]] 
 
If    , then  ̂    whenever the average prior achievement for students assigned to Teacher 0 
is not the same as for Teacher 1 (i.e., [ [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]   ). This formulation also 
illustrates how the type of non-random assignment will matter for our ability to rank the two 
teachers correctly. Assume that Teacher 1 is the better teacher (   ) and the school engages in 
positive assignment with the best prior performing students matched to the better teacher so that 
 [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]. In this case,         and due to the assignment process 
 [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]    implying a negative bias in  ̂. The magnitude of the bias term 
is driven by two factors: how far off the     assumption is and the degree of grouping into the 
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classes. Importantly, if the negative bias is large enough (i.e., larger than  ), our estimate of 
Teacher 1’s value-added relative to Teacher 0 will be of the wrong sign. While the true ranking 
of the teachers would place Teacher 1 above Teacher 2, our estimates would reverse this ranking. 
Just as important is the fact that if the bias is relatively small (i.e., smaller than  ), we may have 
a biased estimate of Teacher 1’s value-added, but we will still get the relative ranking right. If 
the school engages in negative assignment placing the lowest prior performing students with the 
better teacher, the sign of the bias term will be the product of two negative components since 
now  [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]   . In this case, no matter the size of the bias we still get the 
appropriate ranking of the two teachers. This provides a clear implication for assessing value-
added. When the assignment process is generally negative (lower performing students with 
higher performing teachers), we expect rankings of teachers to be less sensitive to the choice of 
specification than under a positive assignment mechanism.
3
 Of course, any policy use depending 
on the magnitudes of the value-added point estimates will still be adversely affected by this bias. 
Finally, consider the third case in which schools nonrandomly group students based on 
ability as before, however, now the teachers are randomly assigned to these classes. Such a 
grouping and assignment policy may be driven by the belief that teachers can better target their 
teaching with more homogeneous classrooms, coupled with an effort to fairly assign teachers to 
classes. While the random assignment of teachers to the classes may, at first glance, seem to 
alleviate concerns over value-added estimates, this scenario can still lead to biased gain score 
estimates. This problem stems from once again leaving i,t-1 in the error term and 
having some teachers assigned classes with better prior performing students by chance.  
                                               
3 Assignment based on a potential match effect (i.e., Teacher 1 is good with low-preforming students) is more 
complicated. The simplified example, however, is sufficient to illustrate the potential for divergent results between 
gain and lag score estimating equations when grouping and assignment is based on prior performance.  
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To illustrate the nature of the bias, let us return to our stylized example. For now, assume 
that the two teachers are equally effective so that    , and we can express our gain score 
estimate as: 
 ̂       [ [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]]   
A clear implication of the     assumption is that assignment based on teacher ability is not 
possible and must effectively be random. Assume that, by luck, Teacher 1 is given the better 
prior performing class so that  [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]    and   is underestimated. 
Instead of ranking the teachers the same (the true ranking), we will rank Teacher 1 lower. Even 
though nonrandom assignment of teachers based on ability is impossible in this case, we have 
biased value-added estimates due to a correlation in the sample between uncontrolled for student 
ability and teacher assignment. Arguments for consistent estimation with nonrandom grouping, 
but random assignment of teachers are based on the number of classes per teacher becoming 
large. With random assignment to heterogeneous groups, a teacher’s luck in one year may be 
balanced out in the future. With many classes per teacher and random assignment of teachers to 
classes, this small sample bias becomes less important with teachers receiving a range of class 
types over time. A similar argument can be made in the presence of grouping on observable 
student characteristics for estimators that do not partial out this correlation.  
Returning to equations (1) and (2), assignment based on unobserved factors found in    or 
    are more difficult to characterize. For instance, prior test scores and student characteristics 
may only capture some of the considerations involved in making assignment decisions, but may 
miss differences in parental involvement in the decision process. To be clear, such unobserved 
factors driving assignment decisions will only lead to an omitted variables problem if they also 
affect current test performance. For the parental involvement example, we might suspect that 
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parents who actively pursue a particular teacher assignment may also provide more educational 
investments leading to a non-zero correlation between these other unobserved investments and 
both the teacher dummy variables and current test score. For the time-invariant factors (captured 
in ci), methods that aim to account for this, such as student fixed effects or dynamic instrumental 
variable approaches, may be useful. However, such methods typically involve strong additional 
assumptions (either that λ=1 or that the errors in Equation [1] are serially uncorrelated) and 
greatly reduce the identifying variation, leading to potentially poor performance (Guarino, 
Reckase, & Wooldridge, in press). Importantly, prior test scores may serve as a decent proxy in 
these cases as they are a function of ci. That is, highly involved parents have likely been involved 
throughout their child’s education, so that part of this investment will be captured in the 
coefficient on prior scores. When the grouping decision is based on time varying unobserved 
factors, there is little that can be done to directly control for this. Once more, prior test scores 
may serve as a decent proxy for these factors if, say, parents are responding to factors that 
affected prior performance. 
While not ubiquitous in the literature, gain-score formulations of the achievement 
regression have been used in recent work (for example, Jackson, 2009, Kinsler, 2011; Subedi, 
Swan, & Hynes, 2011; Koedel, Leatherman, & Parson, 2012; Lefgren & Sims, 2012; Oketch et 
al., 2012). The motivation for using the gain score rather than the lag score varies. It may be 
done to address issues of serial correlation (Jackson, 2009) or measurement error (Koedel, 
Leatherman, & Parson, 2012) in test scores, or to take advantage of panel data estimators aimed 
at improving efficiency (Hierarchical Linear Models, Feasible GLS, empirical Bayes) or tackling 
identification issues (Fixed Effects) that are potentially inconsistent when lagged dependent 
variables are present.  
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Given concerns that test scores are noisy measures of achievement, it is worth 
considering the measurement error motivation for using the gain score in more detail. If the 
measurement error satisfies the classic errors in variables (CEV) assumptions, then it can lead to 
an attenuation bias in the estimate of λ in equation (1). Importantly, under the CEV assumptions, 
measurement error in the dependent variable does not lead to biased estimates. This fact helps 
motivate the use of the gain-score specification in the presence of measurement error, as it moves 
all of the error into the dependent variable.  
The first thing to note here is that we are not evaluating the estimate of λ, but are instead 
concerned with the estimated teacher effects. The attenuation bias in the estimate of λ is 
propagated to the teacher effect estimates depending on the relationship between prior scores and 
teacher assignments. The role of attenuation bias in   due to measurement error can also be 
explored in our stylized model. Recall that our lag score specification was represented by the 
Wald estimator for the following model: 
      
          
However, with classical measurement error in prior achievement, we estimate  ̃    yielding the 
modified equation: 
    ̃  
  (   ̃)  
          
Now the appropriate Wald Estimate is: 
  ̂   [    ̃  
 |    ]   [    ̃  
 |    ]                                                        
  [(   ̃)  
        |    ]   [(   ̃)  
        |    ] 
       ̃ [ [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]]. 
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Due to attenuation,
4
 (   ̃)   , so the sign of the bias term depends on the sign of 
[ [  
 |    ]   [  
 |    ]]. If it is positive (Teacher 1 has the better students), then  ̂     
and we have overestimated Teacher 1’s value-added relative to Teacher 0. If the assignment is 
negative (Teacher 0 has the better students), we will underestimate    which implies 
overestimating Teacher 0’s ability relative to Teacher 1. More generally, teachers with the better 
prior performing classes will be made to look better due to the attenuation bias in  . Intuitively, 
the attenuation bias will reduce the estimated effect of prior scores. This implies that when we 
see good prior performing students do better on current tests, too much of that achievement will 
be attributed to their teacher instead of their prior performance. On the other hand, teachers with 
poorer performing students will look worse since the part of their student’s poor performance 
that is attributable to past achievement is underestimated. 
While there will certainly be a trade-off between the attenuation bias of λ when 
estimating equation (1) and assuming λ    in equation (2), when teacher assignments are based 
on prior scores, it is not clear which bias is more severe. Indeed, it seems quite plausible that an 
attenuated   is less of a concern than assuming    . Indeed, Guarino, Reckase, and 
Wooldridge (in press) find simulation evidence that classical measurement error in test scores 
leads to only very small biases in the ranking of teachers in the data generating processes they 
consider. The sensitivity to measurement error may well be different when considering the 
magnitude of VAMs rather than the ranking. 
                                               
4 The extent of the attenuation depends on the variance of the measurement error and the underlying knowledge 
being measured once the other covariates have been partialed out. When more of the variation in true knowledge is 
explained by the teacher indicators (as well as other covariates) the attenuation is stronger. Therefore, the strength of 
the relationship between the true knowledge and teacher assignment will influence the attenuation. The equations 
presented here are helpful for considering the extent to which a given level of attenuation is propagated to the 
teacher effect estimates. 
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Second, it is likely that the measurement error in test scores does not meet the CEV 
assumptions, as it is derived from the aggregation of the error on separate item responses by 
students. As such, the attenuation bias result does not necessarily hold, and there may be 
problems with mismeasured dependent variables leaving specification (2.2) susceptible to bias as 
well.
5
 Ultimately, the analysis that follows will help identify scenarios in which the distinction 
between using equation (1) or (2) may lead to empirically important differences in the ranking of 
teachers. While the issues underlying the motivation for the gain score specification may 
certainly be important, it is equally important to weigh these considerations next to the cost 
outlined above of assuming λ=1, particularly if grouping based on prior test scores is common. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the lagged test score serves two functions: one is 
to correctly partial out prior test scores and the other is to proxy for factors related to the 
assignment mechanism. If observed prior scores are the basis for assignment, then they are 
important, and properly measured, controls. 
The focus of the first analytic section of this paper is to develop ways to best identify 
different grouping and assignment mechanisms in the types of administrative data sets 
commonly used for value-added in order to inform VAM estimation decisions. While it is 
fundamentally impossible to identify perfectly the scenarios outlined above, it is possible to 
systematically characterize situations in which some estimators and models are likely to deviate 
from each other. Once detection strategies for grouping and assignment have been developed, we 
demonstrate their importance in influencing the results of value-added estimation. 
DATA 
                                               
5 In fact, gain-score specifications can perform especially poorly under the measurement error induced by Item 
Response Theory scaling procedures—i.e., nonclassical measurement error (Guarino et al., 2013).  
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The data used for this study come from the administrative records of a large and diverse state in 
the southeastern region of the US. The data tracks students and teachers in grades 1 through 6 in 
the state’s public school system from the 2000–01 to the 2007–08 school year. With individual 
student test scores and course indicators linking students to their teachers, the data are ideal for 
the estimation of teacher value-added. Importantly, the presence of course-level linkages (as 
opposed to the school grade or exam-proctor linkages found in some similar data sets) allows us 
to identify the set of teachers a student could have potentially been assigned to in a given year. 
Throughout the paper, we use student test scores in mathematics from the statewide standardized 
year-end exams. Typical of such large administrative data sets, there is limited student 
information—primarily demographics and information on school attendance/absences. The 
student demographics are race/ethnicity, gender, disability status,
6
 limited English proficiency 
(LEP), free-or-reduced-price lunch eligibility (FRL), and country of birth. In addition, the data 
include demographic (race/ethnicity and gender) and professional (certification status, degree 
level, and experience
7
) variables for teachers. The set of student and teacher characteristics will 
allow us to examine the extent of sorting and matching on observables. Finally, we limit our 
analysis to teachers teaching a regular mathematics course (typically in middle school) or a 
comprehensive general education class (typically in elementary school). Most of the analysis 
also focuses on school-grade-years with at least two teachers (i.e., situations in which nonrandom 
grouping and assignment is possible), leaving 26,177 school-grade-years covering 2,533 schools. 
                                               
6 We distinguish between students with common high incidence disabilities and those with less common low 
incidence disabilities. The disability categories coded as high incidence are Educable Mentally Handicapped, 
Trainable Mentally Handicapped, Orthopedically Impaired, Speech Impaired, Language Impaired, 
Emotional/Behavioral Disability, Specific Learning Disability, Autistic Spectrum Disorder, Other Health Impaired. 
The disability categories coded as low incidence are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, Visually Impaired, 
Hospital/Homebound, Profoundly Mentally Handicapped, Dual Sensory Impaired, Severely Emotionally Disturbed, 
Traumatic Brain Injured, Developmentally Delayed, and Established Conditions. 
7 Experience is measured as the sum of prior years spent in public and private schools both within and outside the 
state studied. 
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Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our main analysis sample. In addition to means 
and standard deviations for the student and teacher variables, we will use throughout the paper, 
we also provide counts of the number of students, teachers, and school-grade-year cells. In each 
grade, we have roughly 900,000 students. In fourth and fifth grade, there are over 46,000 
teachers, while in sixth grade there are just under 15,000, with many math teachers teaching 
multiple sections.  
[Insert Table 1 Approximately Here] 
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING NONRANDOM GROUPING 
Given the difficulty of detecting nonrandom assignment to teachers, most researchers approach 
the problem by investigating evidence of some form of tracking or grouping of students into 
classrooms. While many papers have considered the teacher assignment decision quite generally 
from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives (Conger, 2005; Feng, 2010; Kalogrides, 
Loeb, & Beteille, 2011), we are concerned with approaches that allow researchers to distinguish 
between different assignment processes and categorize schools accordingly. Here we review two 
particularly influential approaches that have been applied to large administrative data sets from 
the Chicago Public Schools (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007) and North Carolina (Clotfelter, 
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006). Both approaches have been used in a variety of papers to evaluate and 
justify the estimation of education production functions (Ammermuler & Pischke, 2009; Gao 
2012; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010, 2012; Goldhaber, Cowan, & Walch, 2012; Koedel, 2009; 
Koedel & Betts, 2010, 2011; Koedel, Leatherman, & Parsons, 2012; Lavy, 2011; Lugo, 2011; 
Whitmore, 2005). 
Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) (ABS) calculate the average within-class standard 
deviation of prior test scores for separate grade and year groupings. This average Actual standard 
This is a preprint of an article published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21781/abstract  
 
16 
 
deviation is then compared with two counterfactual standard deviations. The first counterfactual, 
referred to as Perfect Sorting,” is obtained by ordering students based on their prior test score 
and creating counterfactual classrooms based on this hierarchy. A second, Random Sorting, 
counterfactual is created in a similar way by ordering students randomly. The goal of this 
exercise is to see if the average Actual standard deviation is closer to the Perfect or Random 
sorting counterfactuals. In their study of data from Chicago Public high schools, ABS found that 
the Actual was much closer to the Random Sorting outcome. Applying this approach to our data 
yields similar results.
8
 
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) (CLV) look for evidence of student grouping in 
North Carolina by conducting a series of six chi-squared tests of whether students’ classroom 
assignments were independent of the following characteristics: gender, race, FRL, attended same 
school in the prior year, had an above average prior test score, and the prior year’s report of 
parental education. The chi-squared tests are performed by school on data from a single year and 
are pooled over third, fourth, and fifth grade. CLV then categorize the 44.9 percent of schools 
that do not reject the null of random assignment in all six cases as non-tracking. Once more, 
applying this approach to our data gives similar results, with 54 percent of schools classified as 
non-tracking. 
Both the ABS and CLV approaches have been used as evidence of random student 
grouping in order to justify the validity of education production function estimation. However, 
by pooling data together and observing an aggregate measure in the ABS approach, the method 
misses important heterogeneity in the sorting behavior of schools. Also, the test focuses on a 
single student characteristic while not exploring other observable characteristics that may drive 
                                               
8 Results available upon request from the authors. 
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the student grouping decision. While the CLV approach considers other characteristics, each is 
tested independently without considering the potential relationships among different 
characteristics. Thus, the CLV approach is susceptible to mischaracterizing the basis for sorting. 
For example, it can easily identify a school as failing the test of independence for both prior test 
scores and free-and-reduced-price lunch status, when in fact the perceived grouping based on 
FRL status is driven entirely by poorer test performance of FRL students.  
In this paper, we implement methods that allow us to uncover the heterogeneity in sorting 
behavior and take into consideration the relationship among several student characteristics. 
Further, we move beyond measures of student grouping and tackle the more difficult problem of 
detecting nonrandom teacher assignment to groups of students. Finally, we demonstrate how 
grouping and assignment affect the results of value-added teacher performance estimation using 
different specification and estimation choices. This discussion is particularly important for policy 
applications in which it is not possible to isolate random grouping subsamples of schools in 
implementing policies.  
INVESTIGATION OF STUDENT GROUPING AND TEACHER ASSIGNMENT 
Nonrandom Grouping of Students into Classrooms 
The student grouping and teacher assignment decision is a complex choice problem facing the 
school administration with potential input from others including teachers and parents. 
Considerations in such decisions are varied, including: achievement goals, noncognitive 
outcomes, peer interactions, and class size constraints, among many others. Our interest lies in 
detecting observable differences across classroom groups that result from the student-teacher 
assignment decision and that may impact value-added estimators. We therefore estimate a series 
of Multinomial Logit (MNL) models of student assignment to classrooms separately for each 
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school-grade-year combination, modeling the probability a student is assigned to a particular 
teacher given the student’s characteristics: 9 
 
     |   
   (   )
  ∑         
 
   
                                                                          (7) 
                                                           
 
The student characteristics in x include the student’s lagged math score, indicators for 
race/ethnicity, gender, disability status, free or reduced price lunch status, limited English 
proficiency, whether a student was foreign born, new to the school, and the number of schools 
the student attended in the prior year.
10
 We are primarily interested in whether each of the 
characteristics is a statistically significant predictor of which teacher a student is assigned and 
less interested in the magnitude of the estimated partial effects, denoted              . 
Therefore, for each MNL, we test that null that the partial effect for a given characteristic, xk, is 
zero for all teachers: 
    
      |  
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      |  
   
                         (8) 
 
We limit our analysis to cases in which the MNL likelihood function maximization 
converged within 300 iterations, covering over 99 percent of the possible cases.
11
  
This procedure gives a large number of results (up to 26,177) to be summarized. In Table 
2, we show the percentage of school-grade-years for which a particular characteristic was found 
to be statistically significant at the 5-percent level (rejecting the null in equation [7]). The table 
                                               
9 Although essentially a reduced form approach, the properties of the MNL as a good approximation in modeling 
choice probabilities are well known (see Cramer, 2007, for the binary case and McFadden, 1974).  
10 The potentially time-varying student characteristics are recorded in the fall of the school year and are therefore 
based on prior evaluations, rather than responding to current teacher or class assignments. 
11 In order to improve the convergence rate, we use three maximization algorithms: Newton-Raphson for the first 
100 iterations, Davison-Fletcher-Powell for the next 100, and Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno for the final 100.  
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also displays the number of times the hypothesis in equation (7) was tested for a given variable.
12
 
By looking at these rejection rates, we gain insight into the observable characteristics of students 
that tend to be related to classroom assignment across the state.
13
 We begin with MNL estimates 
from models that only included the lagged test score. This set of results ties directly to the prior 
literature that looks for grouping based on prior achievement in isolation from other 
characteristics. The significance rates for these MNL estimates are found in the first row of Table 
2. We see that roughly 25 percent of the school-grade-year cells show evidence of grouping 
based on prior achievement in both fourth and fifth grade. In sixth grade, this percentage is much 
higher at 67 percent. This is perhaps not surprising, as in the state studied here many students 
make a promotional school change in grade 6. More specialization in courses occurs as students 
move to middle school. Moreover, if administrators in the new school have less private 
information on the student’s ability, we might expect them to use observed prior achievement to 
engage in ability grouping. Furthermore, these new middle schools tend to be larger, drawing 
from several feeder elementary schools, allowing the schools more opportunity to create 
differentiated sections of courses.  
[Insert Table 2 Approximately Here] 
Moving down the table, we present rejection rates from MNL estimates including the 
student covariates. These results directly allow for relationships between prior test scores and 
student characteristics that had been ignored in previous approaches. Among the characteristics, 
only the lagged test score shows evidence of being predictive of teacher assignment with a 
                                               
12 Note that the number of times a particular hypothesis test was run may be less than total number of estimates; for 
example, if there were no Asian students in the school, then that particular hypothesis test could not be run.  
13 By looking at statistical significance, our approach is easy to apply uniformly across a large number of estimates 
and, as we show later, is effective at identifying cases where value-added estimation is sensitive to non-random 
grouping. While potentially interesting, a comparison of the magnitudes of partial effects becomes much less 
tractable with more than two teachers. 
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substantial degree of frequency. While the rejection rates for prior scores in this specification fall 
slightly compared to those in the first row, suggesting that some of the perceived ability grouping 
may be driven by other characteristics, the general pattern across grades remains the same. 
Characteristics of Schools that Engage in Nonrandom Achievement Grouping  
We next examine which characteristics of schools are associated with being more likely to reject 
the null in equation (7) for the student’s prior test score. To do so, we further disaggregate the 
rejection rates in Table 2 across quartiles of school-level student characteristics. Table 3 presents 
these results using the 5-percent rejection rates for the prior test score from the estimates of MNL 
models that included other student covariates. Note the u-shaped pattern across the distribution 
of black student populations in G4 and G5, with higher rejection rates in the low and high 
proportion black schools. This may relate to the extent of racial heterogeneity there is within 
schools (i.e., in more mixed schools, race becomes a characteristic to sort on in lieu of or in 
addition to using test scores, limiting the role test score sorting may play). A similar pattern 
holds for the FRL populations as well. Moving on, we see higher rejection rates for larger 
schools, those with a larger proportion of Hispanic and LEP students, and lower proportion 
disabled (G6 only). On the surface, the higher rejection rates for larger schools fits nicely with 
the idea that larger schools are afforded more opportunities to create specialized classes. 
However, in this context we cannot separate this effect from the fact that larger schools may 
have more precise estimates due to having more observations in the MNL.
14
  
[Insert Table 3 Approximately Here] 
                                               
14 In simulations with students randomly grouped into classes, the rejection rate for the MNL test are 0.05, 0.02, 
0.01, and 0.01 for school-grade-years with 40, 80, 160, and 240 students, respectively. These school-grade-year 
sizes were chosen to roughly reflect the actual distribution of size in our data. Simulation details are available upon 
request and are similar in nature to those found in Guarino, Reckase, and Wooldridge (in press). 
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The above evidence points to three key improvements over the prior approaches to 
identifying grouping. First, the across school variation in grouping patterns explored in Table 3 
would be missed entirely by the ABS approach. Second, the low rejection rates for other student 
characteristics suggest that, conditional on prior test scores, there is little scope for these 
characteristics to explain student grouping. This result differs from what would be concluded by 
the CLV approach, which considers each characteristic independently. Finally, to highlight the 
heterogeneity that might be missed by previous approaches to identifying grouping, we can 
explore the stability of the grouping category for the same school-grades over time or across 
grades within the same school-year cell. We see the school-grades fall in different categories in 
consecutive years between 35 and 38 percent of the time and, of the school-years with multiple 
grades, 20 percent are categorized differently across the grades. This within school variation in 
grouping would be missed by the CLV and ABS approaches. 
Nonrandom Assignment of Teachers to Classrooms 
The previous estimates attempt to uncover evidence of nonrandom grouping of students together 
into the same classrooms. As discussed in Framework and Background, such nonrandom 
grouping may lead to issues for value-added estimation even in the presence of the random 
assignment of groups to teachers. However, the systematic assignment of teacher to these groups 
of students raises additional concerns. Of particular concern for value-added estimation is 
whether high or low ability students are assigned teachers who are better or worse at improving 
achievement. The following approach is aimed at identifying cases of explicit matching of 
students to particular teachers based on the ability (or characteristics) of both the students and 
teachers.  
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In order to explore the potential matching of students to teachers in this manner, we 
modify the previous MNL approach to include match-specific variables describing some aspect 
of a potential student-teacher match. We will refer to these new estimates as the matching logit 
estimates.
15
 The estimates of    from the previous MNLs varied by teacher (i.e., a different   for 
each teacher) to give an indication of the likelihood that a student with particular characteristics 
is assigned to a particular teacher (indexed by  ) relative to a comparison teacher. The matching 
logits do the same for student characteristics, but estimate a single coefficient across all teachers 
for the match variables discussed below for each school-grade-year cell, giving us an indication 
of whether the assignment process seemed to favor that particular type of match. 
In practice we estimate four separate models each with a different match-specific variable 
aimed at capturing some aspect of the student-teacher match that is related either directly or 
indirectly to ability matching. The four match variables (1) pair student-teacher ability measures, 
(2) examine the consistent placement of high ability students with particular teachers, (3) pair 
more experienced teachers with high-performing students, and (4) match teachers and students 
on the basis of race. 
The first MATCH variable relies on an OLS estimate of prior teacher value-added based 
on the lag score specification as a measure of teacher ability. We use value-added estimated 
using all the prior years of data we have for the teachers. We then create a variable indicating 
whether a given teacher is above average in prior value-added (High Value-Added) compared 
with all other teachers in that school-grade-year cell, denoted     
            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ .
16
 We 
                                               
15 Such a model can be estimated in Stata using the asclogit command. Again, we apply a reduced form approach to 
obtain information about the realized student-teacher assignments.  
16 For this match variable, we necessarily must drop teachers without prior value-added. 
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also define an indicator for a student with above average prior achievement in that cell (High 
Achieving)     
            ̅    . The MATCH variable is then defined by
17
 
       
  {
         
            
          
            
    
         
            
          
            
   
. 
Here, a positive estimate of γ suggests the school prefers to have high (low) ability students 
matched with high (low) ability teachers, while a negative estimate suggests that it prefers 
having high (low) ability students paired with low (high) ability teachers.  
While the approach based on estimated value-added is certainly informative and 
interesting, it rests on having a reliable estimate of value-added. As a major part of the 
motivation for this exercise is to determine conditions under which informative value-added 
estimation may be plausible, it is difficult to make this assumption ex ante. In order to address 
this, we create a second match variable that does not rely on a potentially inconsistent value-
added estimate. We view observing the consistent placement of teachers with high or low 
performing students as a potential marker of ability matching. To be clear, this does not presume 
anything about the ability of the teachers assigned to the classes, but, in the presence of the sort 
of ability assignment we are concerned with, we would expect the same teachers to have similar 
classes year-to-year. Finding evidence of consistent placement does not necessarily indicate 
ability matching is taking place; however, the absence of consistent placement is certainly 
suggestive that ability assignment is not likely, or at least not persistent. 
To operationalize this concept, the second match variable is created in a similar manner 
using the teacher’s prior incoming class average of student scores, rather than value-added. We 
define an indicator for a teacher having an above average incoming class the previous year as 
                                               
17 Note that by using prior value-added, these estimates are based on different cohorts of students than those we are 
using to make the match variables avoiding any mechanical relationship between prior VAM and prior test scores.  
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 . Importantly, this measure is based on the performance of those students the year before 
they had that teacher. Therefore, the second MATCH variable is defined as 
       
  {
           
            
            
            
    
           
            
            
            
   
. 
Third, we consider whether more experienced teachers receive higher performing 
students, given the finding in some prior research that more experienced teachers may be more 
effective at raising test scores (Goldhaber, 2008). First we define an indicator function for a 
teacher with above average experience in that school-grade-year-cell (High Experience) by 
    
            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . The third MATCH variable is then defined as 
       
  {
         
            
          
            
    
         
            
          
            
   
. 
Finally, we create a racial match variable. Schools may choose to match students to 
teachers based on race for a variety of reasons (see Dee, 2004, for evidence that racial matches 
improve student achievement). Given potential differences in student or teacher ability by race, 
this may indirectly lead to ability matching. The indicator for whether a potential student-teacher 
match represents a racial match is constructed as follows: 
       
  {
                
                
. 
Two matching logits are estimated separately for each MATCH variable, one with and 
one without a set of student specific variables.
18
 In specifications that include the student 
covariates, we exclude those student-level variables that were used to create the applicable 
MATCH variable. For instance, we exclude the child race indicators for the race match variable 
                                               
18 The included student covariates are the number of absences the prior year, race indicators, the student’s prior 
achievement, indicators for gender, FRL status, and whether a student is new to a school. We utilize the same 
maximization scheme as for the MNL, allowing for 300 iterations alternating between three maximization 
algorithms. 
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and the student’s prior test score for the other three match variables. As before, we present 
rejection rates for the null that γ=0. We also present rejection rates for one-tail tests to look for 
evidence that γ>0 or γ<0, as unlike in the MNL case, the sign of γ provides information on the 
sorting behavior. We also display the total number of hypothesis tests. 
Beginning with the student-score-teacher-value-added match variable, we see that with 
no additional covariates we reject the null that schools do not match students to teachers based 
on the prior performance of both students and teachers 15 percent and 16 percent of the time in 
fourth and fifth grade, respectively. We find the evidence of this sort of matching is much 
stronger in sixth grade with a rejection rate of 42 percent. We find statistically significant 
negative assignment between 7 percent and 16 percent of cases. There is evidence that positive 
assignment is much more common among the school-grade-year cells tested. When including the 
set of student covariates, we see the rejection rates fall slightly in all grades, suggesting that 
some of the perceived matching of high (low) prior performing students with high (low) prior 
value-added teachers uncovered in the first three columns is being driven by the grouping of 
students with similar observed characteristics into classrooms.  
[Insert Table 4 Approximately Here] 
The evidence here suggests that ability matching, while not the prevailing assignment 
mechanism, influences principals’ decisions to assign students to teachers in a nontrivial number 
of schools—as we reject the null that the coefficient on the match variable is zero in 10 to 15 
percent of 4th-grade school-year cells, 11 to 16 percent of 5th-, and 33 to 42 percent of 6th-grade 
school-year cells. Of course, it should be noted that with this many estimates one might expect a 
rejection about 5 percent of the time, so some of these lower percentages may not be indicative 
of a noticeable amount of nonrandom assignment. On the other hand, however, if other criteria 
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related to student and teacher ability are being used to make decisions, to the extent that our 
ability measures are only proxies, we may understate the extent of ability matching.  
The match variable based on the incoming ability of the teacher’s previous class is found 
to be statistically significant more frequently than the value-added based indicator for all but the 
negative one-tail tests (bottom panel of Table 4). This is perhaps not surprising, as we have noted 
that this measure will likely capture any sort of persistent assignment of teachers to high or low 
performing students. The rejection rates follow a similar pattern to the VAM-based matching 
case as we add covariates. However, these results are stronger than those for matching on the 
teacher’s prior value-added—in some cases, quite a bit stronger. These findings suggest that 
regardless of whether principals are matching students to teachers based on ability, many are 
consistently assigning certain teachers high or low ability classes. In particular, in 51 to 64 
percent of the school-years in the sample, 6th-grade teachers who had high ability classes in the 
past year were likely to get high ability students again, which, as we have shown above, may 
cause problems for value-added.  
From the teacher experience/student test score match, we see that in 14 percent and 15 
percent of 4th- and 5th-grade cells there is evidence of matching based on this characterization. 
However, in sixth grade, nearly half of all cells reject the null. This would seem to suggest that 
many middle schools assign more experienced teachers to classrooms of better prior performing 
students. Adding other student characteristics reduces the rejection rate to 36 percent. Here, we 
also see that some schools show evidence of negative matching (high experience with low 
performers). 
Finally, for the racial match variable, we see that when excluding other covariates, 
nearly10 percent of cases show some evidence of matching based on this characteristic for fourth 
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and fifth grade and nearly 18 percent for sixth grade. The inclusion of the student covariates does 
little to change the overall rejection rates in the two earliest grades; however, it does reduce the 
rejection rate for sixth grade to roughly 9 percent. Importantly, none of the school-grade-years 
tested provide evidence of explicit racial mismatch (a preference for assigning students to 
teachers of a different race) as shown by the second row displaying 0 percent for each grade and 
specification. 
It is worth noting the lower convergence rates for the matching logit than for the MNL 
estimation. For instance, in fourth grade there were 11,116 school-grade-year cells in which the 
MNL estimation converged when including our full set of covariates while only 3,993 did so in 
the racial matching logit estimation with student covariates.
19
 This represents a nontrivial drop in 
the number of results and serves as a limitation of this approach. However, for the school-grade-
cells in which estimation was possible, this approach provides useful information on the 
underlying preferences driving student-teacher assignment decisions. Furthermore, in more 
localized settings with only a handful of schools, it may be possible to appropriately troubleshoot 
in order to find specifications and maximization algorithms that perform better. 
COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF COMMON VALUE-ADDED ESTIMATORS 
UNDER DIFFERENT ASSIGNMENT CONDITIONS 
Our preceding analyses have established the fact that schools can differ widely in the observed 
use of student tracking and teacher assignment mechanisms. Given the importance of 
                                               
19 The lower rates of convergence can be the result of several factors. In many cases, multicollinearity creates flat 
regions of the likelihood function. For instance, when all the teachers in a school-grade-year are of the same race, 
say White, there is no within-student-across-teacher variation in the racial match variable. Effectively the matching 
logit becomes a MNL with a single White/Other Race indicator rather than the set of race indicators in the MNL we 
estimate. With little variation across students in this variable (i.e., if most students are White), the match variable 
becomes highly collinear with the constant in the model. Since the other match variables rely on an above-average 
below-average distinction within school-grade-years, this leads to more variation and better convergence. Generally, 
the matching logit requires a more complicated likelihood function that can be more difficult to estimate. See Gould 
(1996) for a discussion of the convergence of MLE estimation in Stata. 
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understanding the context driving such decisions for the estimation of teacher value-added, we 
now consider how to use the information gathered so far to inform VAM estimation.  
We first describe a set of four value-added estimators in fairly common use and discuss 
how they should be expected to perform in random versus nonrandom grouping and assignment 
scenarios. Under random grouping and assignment, the estimators can be expected to show more 
agreement in their rank ordering of teachers than under nonrandom grouping and assignment 
(Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, in press). To test our predictions, we estimate teacher value-
added in mathematics and reading
20
 using subsets of our data based on the degree of nonrandom 
grouping and assignment, and we display rank correlations within each subsample among the 
estimates produced by the different estimators.  
Using the MNL results that included all student covariates, we distinguish between two 
types of school-grade-year cells, those that exhibited evidence of grouping students based on 
rejecting the null that prior test scores were related to classroom grouping at the 5-percent level 
(the Grouping subsample) and those that did not (the Non-Grouping subsample).
21
 The labels 
Grouping and Non-Grouping were chosen to emphasize that the MNL results tell us about the 
grouping of students into classes, but nothing about the subsequent assignment of teachers to 
these classes.  
To address the potential teacher assignment decisions, we similarly divide our sample of 
school-grade-years into Positive Matching, Negative Matching, and Non-Matching subsamples 
based on the teacher VAM/student score matching logits that included additional student 
                                               
20 To save space throughout, we have reported only mathematics results up to this point. However, as the value-
added implications are the key focus of the study, we provide the reading results here for comparison. The grouping 
and assignment categories described below are based on analogous reading analyses, the results of which are 
available upon request. 
21 While we could use other student characteristics to define groups, the fact that we found little evidence of 
grouping on the other characteristics, conditional on prior scores, implies that the prior score results are the most 
empirically interesting. The results are robust to using a 10-percent significance level cutoff. 
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covariates. While this distinction explores the grouping and assignment decision in more detail, 
there are advantages to using the MNL results as well. Namely, with higher rates of convergence 
and not requiring prior value-added, the MNL based subsamples give better empirical coverage 
while still reflecting grouping scenarios that may lead to problems in identification. In the end, 
both can be thought of as providing markers of potentially problematic grouping/assignment 
mechanisms. 
Estimation Approaches 
We estimate teacher value-added using separate grade-year cross sections of studentlevel 
observations and employ four separate estimation approaches involving the two estimating 
equations discussed in the Framework and Background section.
22
 The main features of 
estimation that we vary are the lag score versus the gain score specifications and the treatment of 
the teacher effects as fixed or random. The specifications with fixed teacher effects (equations 
[1] and [2]) are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), include teacher indicator variables, 
and retain their coefficients as our teacher effects, yielding our OLS Lag and OLS Gain 
estimators.  
Teacher effectiveness estimates derived from the lag-score and gain-score specifications 
would be expected to differ under nonrandom student grouping and nonrandom teacher 
assignment based on prior test scores. As such, we expect the two approaches to yield similar 
                                               
22 We also estimate teacher value-added using student-level panel data (i.e., with several years of data for each 
student) to estimate value-added for teachers in across multiple grades and years. Those results—which do not yield 
qualitatively different conclusions—are presented in the appendix. All appendices are available at the end of this 
article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s website and use the search engine to locate the article at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787. Panel data includes more information on teachers who 
have been teaching for longer periods of time, because we see the performance of multiple cohorts of students. As 
such, it can be helpful to address issues of noise, small sample biases (of the type discussed in section II), or 
unobserved student heterogeneity. However, collection of sufficient panel data for every teacher can be costly and 
delay feedback to teachers. Further, some of the estimator/model combinations we consider are not appropriate for 
use with panel data. Therefore, value-added based on cross-sectional data can be appealing for some policy uses.  
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value-added estimates in cases where there is little evidence of grouping and assignment based 
on prior achievement, but to diverge in cases where such evidence exists.  
When teacher effects are treated as random, we use a mixed effects modeling approach 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood
23
 to obtain empirical Bayes shrinkage estimates of teacher 
effects. These are labeled EB Lag and EB Gain; they are estimates of the Best Linear Unbiased 
Predictors (BLUP) of the teacher effects under appropriate assumptions (See Guarino, Reckase, 
& Wooldridge, in press; Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; and Guarino et al., 2014, for detailed 
discussions). 
The EB approach used here is based on the following mixed effects model: 
                                                                                                       
           
                                                
 
In this set-up, the coefficients on the prior score ( ) and the student covariates ( ) are treated as 
fixed, while the teacher effects (  ) are treated as random. Importantly, this loosely implies that 
teacher effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the prior test scores and student covariates. In 
the mixed effects set up, the EB teacher effects estimates can be obtained by appropriately 
scaling an initial teacher effect estimate by a measure of reliability, specifically,      
  ̅[
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
]. Here, (  ̅) is the within-teacher mean student residual (inclusive of the teacher random 
effects),   
  is the variance of teacher effects,   
  is the student variance, and nj is the number of 
student-level observations for teacher j. From here it is easy to see that the EB estimate shrinks 
an estimated teacher effect toward the mean (normalized to be zero) with noisier estimates based 
on fewer student observations shrunk more. 
                                               
23 In this setup, the coefficients in equation (9) can be estimated by Feasible Generalized Lest Squares (FGLS) or 
MLE. We opt for MLE using the xtmixed command in Stata with the BLUP random effect estimates easily obtained 
postestimation by the predict, reffects command. 
This is a preprint of an article published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21781/abstract  
 
31 
 
A key difference between the OLS and EB approaches is that the OLS approach 
employed here includes indicators for each teacher, treating the teacher effects as fixed, rather 
than random as in the EB case. By leaving the teacher effects in the error term, EB approaches 
do not partial out the relationship between teacher assignment and the other included covariates, 
effectively assuming that this covariance is zero. The OLS approach adopted here does take this 
covariance into account when estimating both the teacher effects and the coefficients on the 
student covariates. In cases where teacher assignment is related to student covariates, we might 
expect this distinction between OLS and EB to become more important than when there is little 
evidence of such a relationship. However, the extent of these differences is an empirical matter. 
Results Comparing Value-Added Estimation Approaches on Different Subsamples 
Table 5 displays the VAM rank correlations across estimators within each sample using math test 
scores, while Table 6 shows the same for reading. For ease of reporting, the rank correlations are 
calculated pooling together all cross sectional value-added results (i.e., each teacher-grade-year 
accounts for one observation).
24
 Starting in Panel A, the OLS Lag and OLS Gain estimates show 
a rank correlation in the Non-Grouping sample of 0.858 in math and 0.813 in reading. The rank 
correlation for the two OLS estimators drops noticeably to 0.754 when applied to the grouping 
sample in math. The difference for reading is even more stark, with a Grouping rank correlation 
of only 0.591. This closely matches our prediction that fixing λ=1 will be more important in 
cases where student grouping is related to prior student performance.  
[Insert Table 5 Approximately Here] 
Moving to the comparison between the OLS Lag and EB Lag estimates for the Non-
Grouping sample, we see a very strong rank correlation of 0.982 in math and 0.963 in reading. 
                                               
24 Separate analysis by grade-year estimation sample yields very similar results and is available upon request.  
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The Grouping samples also show strong, albeit slightly smaller, rank correlations of 0.976 and 
0.955. The small difference across samples and the overall strength of the rank correlations 
suggest, at least in this setting, that the decision to estimate by OLS or EB makes relatively little 
difference for ranking teachers when lagged test scores are included on the right-hand side. If 
instead of ranking teachers, we were interested in the relative magnitude of teacher effects, this 
distinction would become more pronounced. The other rank correlations across Panel A follow 
similarly, with the lag/gain distinction leading to empirically relevant differences in our teacher 
rankings.  
In Panel B, we see a very similar story across our matching samples, however, the 
differences are less pronounced. While the comparison between the positive and negative 
matching subsamples generally goes in the direction predicted, the difference in rank correlations 
is rather small. The lack of a result here may be due to several reasons, including the fact that 
this is a small and select subsample of teachers with prior value-added or that there may be an 
orthogonal source of bias affecting both the prior value-added and the subsequent predictions by 
subsample. Regardless, the fact that the rank correlations are uniformly smaller in either 
matching scenario than the Non-Matching, indicates that we have uncovered a difference in 
assignment patterns that impacts value-added estimation.  
Another way to check the robustness of teacher value-added estimates to nonrandom 
grouping and assignment is to consider how teachers would be classified into performance 
categories by different estimators. We thus divide teachers into quintiles based on their estimated 
math value-added. We then look to see how robust this grouping of teachers is to the use of 
alternative estimators across our samples. Figure 1 displays histograms that show how a 
teacher’s designated quintile may differ across estimation approaches. For example, the first 
This is a preprint of an article published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21781/abstract  
 
33 
 
histogram in the top panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of teacher value-added quintiles 
using the OLS Gain estimates for all teachers who were in the 1st (lowest) quintile using the 
OLS Lag estimates for the grouping sample. The next histogram in the panel shows the 
distribution of quintiles based on the OLS Gain estimates for those in the 2nd quintile of the OLS 
Lag estimates for the same sample. The remaining panels follow similarly. 
[Insert Figure 1 Approximately Here] 
The histograms in Figure 1 tell a similar story to the rank correlations in Table 5 with 
stronger agreement among gain-score and lag-score estimates in the Non-Grouping sample than 
in the Grouping sample. For instance, nearly 74 percent of teachers placed in the highest quintile 
by the OLS Lag estimator are also in the top quintile by the OLS Gain estimator for the Non-
Grouping sample. However, less than 64 percent in the top quintile by OLS Lag are also placed 
in the top quintile by OLS Gain when looking at the grouping sample. We also see that the 
probability of placing teachers in the same quintile by OLS Lag and EB Lag is slightly lower in 
the grouping than in the Non-Grouping sample (between 3 to 5 percentage points). This suggests 
that while the rank correlations presented above are relatively weakly affected by the choice of 
OLS versus EB estimation methods, there is some scope for this choice to affect the grouping of 
teachers into relative performance categories, a practice that is often suggested as a component 
of teacher evaluation and one that is sometimes used to allot rewards and sanctions.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated the importance of methodological choices in estimating 
teacher performance using value-added models, uncovering a set of phenomena of high policy 
relevance in the current climate of educational reform aimed at accountability. We have 
developed and applied a careful approach to identifying evidence in large administrative data 
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sets of nonrandom assignment of students to teachers, documenting considerable differences 
across schools in the extent of this behavior and showing how to use this information to inform 
value-added estimation.  
We find clear evidence that many schools do engage in student grouping based on prior 
academic performance, a fact that has been obscured by the more aggregated statistics used in 
the prior literature to identify such sorting. We find less evidence that schools commonly group 
students in classrooms based on other characteristics, conditional on prior achievement. 
Importantly, we see large variation in the extent of grouping when looking across school-grade-
years. Further, we see some variation in the extent of this grouping across schools serving 
different student populations. For instance, schools with higher Limited English Proficiency 
student populations are more likely to be found to engage in test score grouping.  
We also find evidence to suggest that some explicit student-teacher ability matching takes 
place, particularly for certain school-grade-years. The presence of matching represents a greater 
threat to the ability of VAMs to recover reliable effect estimates. Although we are limited in our 
ability to accurately pinpoint these instances and capture the full extent of ability matching, our 
results provide suggestive evidence that such matching does occur. Overall, our use of 
multinomial logit techniques represents a significant contribution to the effort to diagnose 
nonrandom grouping and assignment in nonexperimental contexts—an issue that must be 
grappled with in policy as well as research applications due to increased pressures to evaluate 
teachers according to their performance.  
Importantly, we find that categorizing schools based on observed patterns of grouping 
and assignment can lead to substantial differences in the sensitivity of value-added estimates of 
teacher effectiveness to different estimation procedures. Namely, the manner in which the chosen 
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model takes prior student achievement into account, through a gain score or lag score 
specification, becomes more important in cases of student achievement grouping and 
assignment. In prior work using simulations (Guarino, Reckase, & Wooldridge, in press), OLS 
applied to a lag score specification that treats teacher effects as fixed was shown to be more 
adept at recovering true teacher effects across a number of different assignment scenarios. Here, 
our investigations have borne out predictions that this specification will produce estimates that 
diverge from those from the gain-score specification under circumstances in which nonrandom 
grouping and assignment based on prior scores is detectable. That the OLS Lag estimator 
controls for this potential confounder directly, reinforces the evidence that in many cases this 
estimator may be preferable to other popular estimators currently in use. At the very least, the 
motivation for using a gain-score formulation should be balanced against this clear and 
identifiable threat to validity in cases of explicit test-score grouping. This is particularly true in 
cases in which a single estimator of teacher effectiveness is relied upon (e.g., in many policy 
scenarios).
25
  
Our results suggest caution when settling upon an estimation strategy that is to be 
universally applied across schools, and, in particular, in applying estimation strategies that rely 
on assumptions of persistent decay. Methods will matter and are of particular relevance in policy 
applications that assign rewards and sanctions to teachers based on value-added.   
                                               
25 Note that researchers comparing alternative estimators of education production functions as part of robustness 
checks should also consider our results in weighing the validity of each estimate. 
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Appendix A: Performance of Panel Data Value-Added Estimates 
In the panel data context, we use four different model/estimator combinations. As in the cross-
section case, we estimate value-added by OLS using both the Lag Score and Gain Score 
specifications (OLS Lag and OLS Gain). The panel context presents additional challenges and 
opportunities for estimating value-added. Namely, both OLS estimators ignore the presence of 
unobserved student heterogeneity. To address this possibility, the gain score specification can be 
easily estimated allowing for student fixed effects, yielding our Fixed Effects (FE Gain) 
estimator. The appeal of the FE Gain estimator comes at the cost of using the gain score 
specification. This is due to the strict exogeneity assumption needed for the consistency of FE 
that is violated when a lagged dependent variable is included on the right-hand side. Thus, like 
OLS Gain, it may lead to an omitted variables problem if teacher assignment is based on prior 
scores, here conditional on the student heterogeneity. 
A final panel data estimator considered is the Empirical Bayes (EB) shrinkage estimate of 
teacher effects applied to the Gain score equation (EB Gain). Importantly, in the panel data 
context, the EB estimator requires a similar strict exogeneity assumption to FE Gain, once again 
precluding estimation of the lag score specification. Like the OLS Gain and Lag estimators, EB 
Gain does not allow for unobserved student heterogeneity to be correlated with inputs.  
Many of the predictions outlined in the main text for the cross-sectional estimates apply 
here to the panel case. However, the introduction of the FE Gain estimates provides a distinct set 
of predictions. Differences in estimated value-added between OLS Lag and FE Gain will result 
from the appropriateness of the gain score specification, the importance of time-invariant 
unobserved student heterogeneity in the teacher assignment decision, potential violation of the 
strict exogeneity assumption, and increased noise due to the within-student demeaning. As such, 
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we might expect larger divergence between estimates for this comparison than others, regardless 
of the grouping and assignment scenario. In contrast, comparisons between OLS Gain and FE 
Gain will not depend on the appropriateness of the gain score specification as both estimators 
rely on the gain score assumptions. However, due to the other differences in assumptions, we 
expect ranking of teachers to generally diverge the most when comparing FE Gain to any of our 
other estimators. 
 Appendix Table A1 displays rank correlations between the panel data estimators within 
the different samples defined in the main text. As in the cross-sectional case, we see that the 
Gain/Lag decision holds more weight than the OLS/EB decision, with rank correlations 
diverging more when comparing an estimate from the gain score specification to one from the 
lag score specification. As predicted, the rank correlations with the FE Gain estimator tend to be 
relatively low overall yet slightly higher for OLS Gain than OLS Lag. Interestingly, the rank 
correlations are noticeably larger in the Non-Grouping and Non-Matching samples with 
particularly striking differences between matching and Non-Matching samples. The ranking of 
teachers in our matching samples are highly sensitive to the choice of estimating by OLS Lag or 
FE Gain with rank correlations under 0.25. Given the many reasons for these two estimators to 
diverge (outlined above), it is difficult derive simple recommendations other than to urge 
cautious interpretation of results and a careful choice of preferred estimator. 
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Table 1. Main analysis sample: School-grade-years with more than one class. 
  
Grade 
  
G4 G5 G6 All 
Observations     
Students 950,915 949,849 883,423 2,784,187 
Teachers 48,947 46,800 14,718 110,465 
School-grade-years  11,139 10,984 4,054 26,177 
 
        
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Student variables         
Prior test score 1400 276 1508 247 1651 222 1516 270 
Asian 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 
Black 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 
Hispanic 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 
Other race 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Disability: High incidence 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 
Disability: Low incidence 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
Free or reduced lunch 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Limited English 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.20 
Foreign born 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 
Days absent prior year 7.17 6.91 7.19 6.95 7.42 7.39 7.25 7.08 
New to school 0.95 0.21 0.34 0.48 0.94 0.24 0.74 0.44 
Number of schools attended prior year 1.09 0.30 1.07 0.28 1.08 0.29 1.08 0.29 
Teacher variables         
Asian 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 
Black 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35 
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Other race 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 
Female 0.91 0.29 0.82 0.38 0.73 0.44 0.85 0.36 
Years experience 9.77 9.82 11.29 10.66 10.24 10.34 10.48 10.28 
Prior value-added 7.96 54.68 10.83 56.55 -10.43 55.88 6.98 56.04 
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Table 2. Predictors of classroom grouping: percentage of separate school-grade-year MNLs in which the 
predictor was significant at the 5-percent level. 
 
Grade 
 
G4 G5 G6 
 
Percentage # tests Percentage # tests Percentage # tests 
Specification 1 Prior Score Only 
Prior math score 24.52 11,137 25.35 10,981 67.34 4,054 
Specification 2 Prior Score with Other Covariates 
Prior math score 20.62 11,110 21.41 10,927 63.23 4,030 
Asian 0.29 5,828 0.31 6,200 1.38 3,041 
Black 1.39 10,252 1.46 10,174 5.16 3,894 
Hispanic 1.10 9,826 1.45 9,808 3.66 3,827 
Other race 0.37 8,393 0.35 8,336 1.37 3,569 
Female 1.54 11,095 1.63 10,914 7.65 4,025 
Disabled—High incidence 4.66 10,915 5.30 10,734 17.91 3,965 
Disabled—Low incidence 0.19 1,068 0.16 1,267 0.83 1,079 
FRL 4.20 10,870 4.30 10,722 8.67 3,990 
LEP 1.12 6,331 0.95 6,288 8.31 2,827 
Foreign born 0.75 8,824 0.86 8,990 3.45 3,623 
Prior year absences 3.98 11,103 3.99 10,919 7.03 4,028 
Student in new school 6.18 8,156 3.76 9,172 11.89 2,574 
Number of schools in year 2.94 10,717 7.03 10,378 6.44 3,976 
Pseudo    distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5th percentile 0.11 0.11 0.05 
Median 0.21 0.21 0.16 
95th percentile 0.44 0.46 0.47 
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Table 3. MNL rejection rates (percentage) for prior scores in specification 2 broken out by 
quartiles of school-level student characteristics. 
School characteristic Grade Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All 
Black 4 26.12 20.06 15.43 21.07 20.62 
 
5 25.58 20.50 17.15 22.67 21.41 
 
6 62.35 63.87 60.06 67.28 63.23 
Hispanic 4 14.44 15.72 21.69 29.96 20.62 
 
5 14.92 15.83 23.39 30.76 21.41 
 
6 53.75 55.30 68.42 74.21 63.23 
Disabled 4 22.20 21.82 21.38 17.95 20.62 
 
5 22.18 23.94 21.74 18.43 21.41 
 
6 67.79 67.04 56.56 49.20 63.23 
FRL 4 22.69 17.32 17.21 25.30 20.62 
 
5 21.76 19.91 18.58 25.48 21.41 
 
6 60.94 63.54 63.03 66.35 63.23 
LEP 4 13.31 19.48 24.04 25.31 20.62 
 
5 12.75 20.20 25.39 26.76 21.41 
 
6 51.18 60.04 67.46 73.30 63.23 
Enrollment 4 9.89 14.00 22.69 37.15 20.62 
 
5 10.61 14.87 23.46 37.21 21.41 
 
6 37.60 48.31 61.94 71.46 63.23 
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Table 4. Five-percent significance-level rejection rates (percentage) of match variables from matching 
logit estimates.  
  
MATCH variable only MATCH and other covariates 
MATCH variable Test 4th grade 5th grade 6th grade 4th grade 5th grade 6th grade 
VAM-score match γ 0 14.65 15.67 42.16 10.92 11.87 33.03 
 
γ<0 7.52 7.44 15.92 6.41 6.79 13.16 
 
γ>0 12.88 14.00 32.64 9.93 10.55 25.60 
 
# 5372 5915 1639 4743 5745 1535 
        Class-score match γ 0 33.00 32.84 63.78 21.71 22.99 50.99 
 
γ<0 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.38 0.48 0.28 
 
γ>0 41.71 41.74 68.89 29.42 29.90 56.04 
  # 8269 8836 2681 7291 8544 2516 
        
Exp-score match γ 0 13.94 15.26 44.47 10.23 11.93 36.15 
 
γ<0 8.63 9.20 21.32 7.01 7.78 17.52 
 
γ>0 11.59 12.10 29.33 8.82 10.06 24.68 
 
# 8049 8643 2584 7086 8390 2415 
        
Racial match γ 0 9.83 9.39 17.92 9.69 9.48 9.37 
 
γ<0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
γ>0 10.03 10.37 17.34 9.17 9.57 9.53 
 
# 4507 4930 1384 3993 4798 1291 
Note: The test column indicates the alternative hypothesis; therefore the first row indicates the 
percentage of times the test rejects the null of a zero coefficient, the second row of each panel indicates 
the percentage of times our results provide evidence of negative assignment, while the third row does so 
for positive assignment 
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Table 5. Cross-sectional math VAM rank correlations by grouping and matching samples. 
Panel A: Grouping and Non-Grouping samples 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Lag 
 
Sample G NG G NG G NG 
OLS Gain G 0.754 
     
 
NG 
 
0.858 
    
EB Lag G 0.976 
 
0.752 
   
 
NG 
 
0.982 
 
0.854 
  
EB Gain G 0.737 
 
0.969 
 
0.776 
 
 
NG 
 
0.851 
 
0.979 
 
0.874 
 
Panel B: Positive, Negative, and Non-matching samples. 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Lag 
 
Sample +M -M NM +M -M NM +M -M NM 
OLS Gain +M 0.807  
  
 
  
 
 
 -M  0.813        
 
NM 
 
 0.845 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EB Lag +M 0.985  
 
0.807  
 
 
 
 
 -M  0.984  0.812    
 
NM 
 
 0.988 
 
 0.844 
 
 
 EB Gain +M 0.791  
 
0.979  
 
0.820  
 
 -M  0.801   0.982  0.825  
 
NM 
 
 0.841 
 
 0.985 
 
 0.859 
Sample sizes: G=50,812; NG=91,533; +M=8,483; -M=4,382; NM=44,614 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional reading VAM rank correlations by grouping and matching 
samples. 
Panel A: Grouping and Non-Grouping samples 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Lag 
 
Sample G NG G NG G NG 
OLS Gain G 0.591 
 
    
 
NG 
 
0.813 
    
EB Lag G 0.955 
 
0.598 
 
  
 
NG 
 
0.963 
 
0.803 
  
EB Gain G 0.558 
 
0.941 
 
0.623 
 
 
NG 
 
0.792 
 
0.957 
 
0.834 
 
Panel B: Positive, Negative, and Non-Matching samples 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Lag 
 
Sample +M -M NM +M -M NM +M -M NM 
OLS Gain +M 0.702  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 -M  0.724        
 
NM 
 
 0.811 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EB Lag +M 0.974  
 
0.720  
 
 
 
 
 -M  0.970   0.727     
 
NM 
 
 0.969 
 
 0.806 
 
 
 EB Gain +M 0.677  
 
0.969  
 
0.727  
  -M  0.699   0.965   0.742  
 
NM 
 
 0.790 
 
 0.968 
 
 0.828 
Sample sizes: G=38,976; NG=78,573; +M=6,640; -M=3,954; NM=50,836 
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OLS Lag by OLS Gain: Grouping Sample 
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OLS Lag by OLS Gain: No Grouping Sample 
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OLS Lag by EB Lag: Grouping Sample 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
OLS Lag 1st Quintile OLS Lag 2nd Quintile OLS Lag 3rd Quintile OLS Lag 4th Quintile OLS Lag 5th Quintile 
 
OLS Lag by EB Lag: No Grouping Sample 
Figure 1, OLS Lag Quintile by OLS Gain and EB Lag Quintiles. 
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table A1: Panel VAM rank correlations by grouping and matching samples. 
Panel A: Grouping and Non-Grouping Samples from MNL results 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Gain 
 
Sample G NG G NG G NG 
OLS Gain G 0.805 
     
 
NG 
 
0.852 
    EB Gain G 0.777 
 
0.966 
   
 
NG 
 
0.829 
 
0.960 
  FE Gain G 0.517 
 
0.573 
 
0.578 
 
 
NG 
 
0.635 
 
0.661 
 
0.647 
 Panel B: Matching and Non-Matching samples from CL results. 
Estimator/Model 
 
OLS Lag OLS Gain EB Gain 
 
Sample +M -M NM +M -M NM +M -M NM 
OLS Gain +M 0.858  
  
 
  
 
 
 -M  0.849        
 
NM 
 
 0.854 
 
 
  
 
 
EB Gain +M 0.766  
 
0.913  
  
 
 
 -M  0.798   0.951     
 
NM 
 
 0.831 
 
 0.968 
 
 
 
FE Gain +M 0.232  
 
0.271  
 
0.266  
 
 -M  0.147   0.227   0.276  
 
NM 
 
 0.567 
 
 0.596 
 
 0.580 
Sample sizes: G=26,887; NG=36,421; +M=8,049; -M=4,300; NM=32,368 
 
 
 
 
 
